It is clear that harmful agents are targets of severe condemnation, but it is much less clear how perceivers conceptualize the agency of harmful agents. The current studies tested two competing predictions made by moral typecasting theory and the dehumanization literature. Across six studies, harmful agents were perceived to possess less agency than neutral (non-offending) and benevolent agents, consistent with a dehumanization perspective but inconsistent with the assumptions of moral typecasting theory. This was observed for human targets (Studies 1-2b and 4-5) and corporations (Study 3), and across various gradations of harmfulness (Studies 3 and 4). Importantly, denial of agency to harmful agents occurred even when controlling for perceptions of the agent's likeability (Studies 2a and 2b) and while using two different operationalizations of agency (Study 2a). Study 5 showed that harmful agents are denied agency primarily through an inferential process, and less through motivations to see the agent punished. Across all six studies, harmful agents were deemed less worthy of moral standing as a consequence of their harmful conduct and this reduction in moral standing was mediated through reductions in agency. Our findings clarify a current tension in the moral cognition literature, which have direct implications for the moral typecasting framework.
Introduction
There is probably no moral intuition more fundamental and ubiquitous than the rejection of cruelty or the infliction of harm for purely selfish reasons (Gert, 2004; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Greene, 2012; Henrich et al., 2006; Piazza, Landy, & Goodwin, 2014; Pinker, 2012; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2009; Sousa, Holbrook, & Piazza, 2009; Sousa & Piazza, 2014; Turiel, 1983) . Historically, societies have not always agreed on which actions constitute cruelty or which individuals and entities are deserving of protection from such abuses (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Piazza et al., 2014; Singer, 2011) . Yet this fact does not negate the core intuition that individuals who cause unjustified harm have violated an implicit social contract to respect the basic interests of others (Baumard, Andre, & Sperber, 2013; Sousa & Piazza, 2014) , or the retributive logic that harmful agents are deserving of punishment (Ashworth, 2010; Baumard, 2011; Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; Darley & Pittman, 2003) .
A vast literature within psychology supports the idea that harmful agents are targets of often severe condemnation (e.g., Bastian, Denson, & Haslam, 2013; Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011; Carlsmith et al., 2002; Gray, 2014; Gray & Wegner, 2009; Vasquez, Loughnan, Gootjes-Dreesbach, & Weger, 2014) . However, much less research has considered the attributions people make with regards to the underlying agency of harmful agents. Currently, there are two perspectives on the matter, each with competing predictions. According to moral typecasting theory (hereon MTT; Gray & Wegner, 2009), harmful agents should be perceived as highly agentive-indeed, as agentive as positive moral actors-and certainly more agentive than neutral or non-offending actors (see also Gray, 2010; Gray & Schein, 2012; Gray & Wegner, 2011) . From this perspective, when a person commits an act of cruelty they are ''transformed" (Gray, 2010) or ''typecasted" (Gray & Wegner, 2009) in the eyes of those bearing witness to their actions. The result is that perceivers imbue the target with agency (see Gray, 2010) , or, put another way, they are attributed the qualities befitting a ''moral agent" (see Gray & Wegner, 2009 q Author note: The first two authors contributed equally to this paper, and order of authorship was determined randomly.
